Saint Louis University Law Journal
Volume 64
Number 2 Winter 2020
4-27-2020

Reframing Bitcoin and Tax Compliance
Arvind Sabu
Chicago-Kent College of Law, asabu@kentlaw.iit.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Arvind Sabu, Reframing Bitcoin and Tax Compliance, 64 St. Louis U. L.J. (2020).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol64/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more
information, please contact Susie Lee.

Article 4

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

REFRAMING BITCOIN AND TAX COMPLIANCE
ARVIND SABU*
This Article argues that, contrary to the common belief that Bitcoin enables
tax evasion, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) can increasingly police
transactions in Bitcoin. First, commercial and technical intermediaries have
emerged as part of Bitcoin’s ecosystem. This diverse set of intermediaries can
facilitate tax enforcement, as the litigation over the IRS’s summons on
Coinbase—the largest domestic digital asset exchange—and subsequent IRS
efforts show. These intermediaries could report transactions to the IRS or even,
one day, withhold and remit tax payments. Second, the publicly visible,
trustworthy nature of Bitcoin’s blockchain—its unique role as a shared truth—
allows tax authorities to observe transaction flows. This renders Bitcoin
unusually regulable for tax purposes, as recent efforts by the IRS to rely on
Bitcoin’s blockchain to police tax evasion demonstrate. The Article offers a
proposal by which the IRS might make better use of Bitcoin’s blockchain: the
IRS can tailor an existing program to reward technically savvy whistleblowers
who scour Bitcoin’s blockchain and determine identities that correspond to
public Bitcoin addresses at issue.
INTRODUCTION
Cryptocurrency seems to challenge the operation of the tax system. 1 At a
White House Press Briefing on cryptocurrency in July of 2019, Treasury
Secretary Steven Mnuchin said, “[c]ryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, have been

* Visiting Assistant Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law. Thanks to Lori Andrews, Felice
Batlan, William Birdthistle, Alex Boni-Saenz, Evelyn Brody, David Cameron, Sungjoon Cho,
Charlotte Crane, John Kim, Sarah Lawsky, Ed Lee, Nancy Marder, Ajay Mehrotra, Zaineb
Mohammed, Philip Postlewaite, Greg Reilly, Mark Rosen, and Chris Schmidt for helpful
conversations, comments, and/or encouragement. All errors are my own.
1. See, e.g., Omri Marian, Blockchain Havens and the Need for Their InternationallyCoordinated Regulation, 20 N.C.J.L. & TECH. 529, 529 (2019); Omri Marian, Are
Cryptocurrencies Super Tax Havens?, 112 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 38, 38–39 (2013);
Manoj Viswanathan, Tax Compliance in a Decentralizing Economy, 34 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 283, 283
(2018).
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exploited to support billions of dollars of illicit activity like cybercrime, tax
evasion, extortion, ransomware, illicit drugs, [and] human trafficking.” 2
Bitcoin, the first and largest cryptocurrency by market capitalization, 3
purports to enable pseudonymous transactions independent of third-party
intermediaries. 4 Normally, third-party intermediaries—such as banks,
employers, and brokers—play a key role in federal income tax compliance; they
serve important reporting and, sometimes, withholding functions with respect to
their distribution of different forms of income to account holders or employees. 5
The ability of Bitcoin to circumvent those intermediaries and its pseudonymity
thus seem to threaten our system of tax compliance. 6
Does the tax evasion described by Mnuchin signal the beginning of a more
broad-ranging shift? A co-founder of the Cypherpunks, a group important to the
development of cryptocurrency, 7 wrote the Crypto Anarchist Manifesto in
1988. 8 It reads in part:
A specter is haunting the modern world, the specter of crypto anarchy.
Computer technology is on the verge of providing the ability for individuals and
groups to communicate and interact with each other in a totally anonymous
manner. Two persons may exchange messages, conduct business, and negotiate
electronic contracts without ever knowing the True Name, or legal identity, of
the other. Interactions over networks will be untraceable, via extensive rerouting of encrypted packets and tamper-proof boxes which implement
cryptographic protocols with nearly perfect assurance against any
tampering. . . . These developments will alter completely the nature of
2. Press Release, White House Press Briefing by Treasury Sec’y Steven Mnuchin on
Regulatory Issues Associated with Cryptocurrency (July 15, 2019), https://home.treasury.gov/
news/press-releases/sm731 [https://perma.cc/Q5F9-BC8E].
3. Bitcoin, COINMARKETCAP, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/bitcoin/ [https://perma.
cc/6XTK-RKAF] (last visited Aug. 1, 2019).
4. Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN.ORG 1
(2008), https://Bitcoin.org/Bitcoin.pdf [hereinafter Bitcoin Whitepaper] (“What is needed is an
electronic payment system based on cryptographic proof instead of trust, allowing any two willing
parties to transact directly with each other without the need for a trusted third party.”).
5. See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax
Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 697 (2007) (“The structural mechanisms the federal income
tax uses . . . make use of third parties to the taxpayer/government relationship.”).
6. Viswanathan, supra note 1, at 326 (“Blockchain technologies have the potential to shift
transactions away from centralized, established third-party reporters to distributed networks of
payors, thereby undermining existing information protocols.”).
7. ARVIND NARAYANAN ET AL., BITCOIN AND CRYPTOCURRENCY TECHNOLOGIES: A
COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION xvi–xvii (2016) (“Cypherpunks was the predecessor to the
mailing list where Satoshi Nakamoto would later announce Bitcoin to the world, and this is no
coincidence.”).
8. Nathaniel Popper, Timothy C. May, Early Advocate of Internet Privacy, Dies at 66, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/21/obituaries/timothy-c-may-dead.html
[https://perma.cc/QU43-5HXV].
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government regulation, the ability to tax and control economic interactions, the
ability to keep information secret, and will even alter the nature of trust and
reputation. 9

More recently, a scholar of blockchain and professor of business framed tax
evasion by way of cryptocurrencies as a form of “cryptosecession” from the
existing system of states premised on territorial jurisdiction. 10
Even if Bitcoin does not lead to a withering away of the state, its amenability
to tax evasion may challenge political initiatives to remedy inequality.11
Presidential candidate Elizabeth Warren has proposed a two percent wealth tax
on households worth more than fifty million dollars, with an additional one
percent surtax on households worth more than one billion dollars. 12 Warren
proposes to use the tax revenue for a broad range of initiatives; these include the
cancellation of a large amount of student loan debt, universal child care, and free
public university. 13 Two economists have determined that the wealth tax would
raise $2.75 trillion, even factoring in some amount of tax evasion. 14 They
assume, however, that no major asset class would be exempt from wealth
9. Timothy C. May, The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto, ACTIVISIM.NET: CYPHERPUNKS (Nov.
22, 1992, 12:11 PM), https://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/crypto-anarchy.html [https://perma.cc/
J62B-VPEB]. The manifesto goes on to offer more rousing libertarian rhetoric, technical details,
and predictions, some of which are prescient; it emphasizes, once again, the ability of cryptologic
technologies to fundamentally alter the nature of government’s “interference” in economic
transactions. Id. (“Just as the technology of printing altered and reduced the power of medieval
guilds and the social power structure, so too will cryptologic methods fundamentally alter the nature
of corporations and of government interference in economic transactions.”).
10. Trent MacDonald, Theory of Non-Territorial Internal Exit 1, 8 (Feb. 2015), https://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2661226 [https://perma.cc/8GZE-5JV2] (writing that
“[c]ryptosecession is the process in which citizens secede from an incumbent state and recoalesce
in new ‘virtual states’ that are akin to non-territorial public good clubs,” and that though “described
as a form of tax evasion, . . . it is more accurately classified as a process of partial secession and de
facto jurisdiction formation.”).
11. See generally LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND
JUSTICE (2002). Taxes can be an important instrument to control inequality in capitalist economies.
Id. at 3 (“In a capitalist economy, taxes are not just a method of payment for government and public
services: They are also the most important instrument by which the political system puts into
practice a conception of economic or distributive justice.”).
12. John Cassidy, Why Elizabeth Warren’s Wealth Tax Would Work, THE NEW YORKER (Jan.
31, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/elizabeth-warrens-wealth-tax-is-anold-idea-and-its-time-has-come [https://perma.cc/4H4S-VHD6].
13. Jon Greenberg, Elizabeth Warren: Does her Wealth Tax Pay for her Child Care and
Higher Education Plans?, POLITIFACT (Apr. 25, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.politifact.com/
truth-o-meter/article/2019/apr/25/elizabeth-warren-does-her-wealth-tax-pay-her-child/ [https://per
ma.cc/ES2C-ZGGN].
14. Letter from Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman, Professors of Economics, University of
California at Berkeley, to Senator Elizabeth Warren (Jan. 18, 2019), https://elizabethwarren.com/
wp-content/uploads/2019/01/saez-zucman-wealthtax-warren-v5-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/4G3BN5H9].

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

184

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:181

taxation. 15 The relatively new asset class of cryptocurrency might challenge this
redistributive vision if it enables a significant amount of wealth to effectively
defy taxation.
This Article is the first to argue that, contrary to common wisdom, Bitcoin
is increasingly regulable 16 by tax authorities. Though Bitcoin enables peer-topeer transfers that do not rely on third-party intermediaries such as banks, 17
excitement about disintermediation 18—the elimination of intermediaries—
should not obscure the emergence of a rich set of commercial and technical
intermediaries in Bitcoin’s ecosystem. These include online wallets, digital asset
exchanges, second-layer payment protocols which operate on top of the original
Bitcoin protocol, and others. The IRS’s use of a distinctive technique for
gathering tax information from third parties—a John Doe summons—on
Coinbase, the largest domestic digital asset exchange and an online wallet,
shows how new intermediaries can facilitate tax enforcement actions.
Suspicions about the way in which disintermediation and peer-to-peer
networks might enable cyberanarchy are not entirely new, and the literature
regarding the regulability of the internet provides a framework for Part II of the
Article. 19 The emergence of important intermediaries in Bitcoin facilitate
regulability, 20 just as they did in the case of the early internet. 21 Intermediaries
are particularly important in tax, considering they are oftentimes the repositories

15. Id.
16. Regulability here refers to “the capacity of a government to regulate behavior within its
proper reach.” LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 23 (2d ed. 2006).
17. Bitcoin Whitepaper, supra note 4, at 1.
18. See, e.g., DANIEL DRESCHER, BLOCKCHAIN BASICS: A NON-TECHNICAL INTRODUCTION
IN 25 STEPS 24 (2017) (“Purely distributed peer-to-peer systems have a huge commercial potential
as they can replace centralized systems and change whole industries due to disintermediation.”);
but see PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW: THE RULE OF
CODE 8 (2018) (“Blockchains may reduce the need for intermediaries, but they are unlikely to
eliminate them altogether.”).
19. See generally Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 (1998);
JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS
WORLD (2006); David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); LESSIG, supra note 16; DEBORA L. SPAR, RULING THE
WAVES: CYCLES OF DISCOVERY, CHAOS, AND WEALTH FROM THE COMPASS TO THE INTERNET 4
(2001) (“Even if they had path-breaking technology, and even if they flourished for some time in a
period of blissful chaos, many entrepreneurs eventually found themselves caught by a system that
bit back—by markets that reasserted their old ways or governments that outraced the technological
frontier and claimed it for themselves.”).
20. See DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 18, at 173–79; Andy Yee, Internet Architecture and
the Layers Principle: A Conceptual Framework for Regulating Bitcoin, 3 INTERNET POL’Y REV.
1, 5–7 (2014).
21. See LESSIG, supra note 16, at 61; GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 19, at 70–71.
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of relevant transaction information, and can perform withholding and reporting
functions. 22
Bitcoin differs from the internet in important ways, however, and represents
a novel architecture of trust; 23 the publicly visible, trustworthy nature of
Bitcoin’s blockchain renders it unusually regulable for tax purposes. The IRS
can observe transaction flows that occur on Bitcoin’s blockchain. Put
differently, the IRS can rely upon Bitcoin’s blockchain just as Bitcoin’s users
do: as a trustworthy transactional ledger that is not susceptible to falsification,
absent a technical attack that verges on the impossible. 24 In this vein, the Article
points to the IRS’s efforts to use Bitcoin’s blockchain to police tax compliance
and offers a proposal regarding the way tax authorities might make better use of
Bitcoin’s blockchain.
Part I explains the history and operation of Bitcoin and summarizes existing
tax scholarship on it. That scholarship by and large characterizes Bitcoin as a
threat to the existing tax system. 25
Part II argues that the emergence of different sorts of intermediaries that
operate with the Bitcoin network can increasingly facilitate tax compliance.
Specifically, though Bitcoin is often understood in terms of disintermediation,
new intermediaries such as digital asset exchanges, online wallets, operators of
second-layer payment protocols, and other actors who cater to institutions
interested in Bitcoin have emerged or are emerging. These new commercial and
technical intermediaries can increasingly facilitate tax enforcement, as the IRS’s
John Doe summons on Coinbase, the largest domestic digital asset exchange,
will show. There are indications that these intermediaries may eventually engage
in more comprehensive information reporting, and they could even, one day,
withhold and remit tax payments to the IRS.
Part III contends that the publicly visible, trustworthy nature of Bitcoin’s
ledger renders it uniquely regulable for tax purposes. That Part outlines the IRS’s
efforts to use Bitcoin’s blockchain to police tax compliance and offers a proposal
regarding the ways tax authorities might better take advantage of Bitcoin’s
blockchain. Specifically, the IRS can gamify its whistleblower program to incent

22. See, e.g., Lederman, supra note 5, at 697.
23. KEVIN WERBACH, THE BLOCKCHAIN AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF TRUST 17 (2018).
24. Bitcoin Whitepaper, supra note 4, at 5, 8; NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 48–50.
25. See, e.g., Eric Engle, Is Bitcoin Rat Poison? Cryptocurrency, Crime, and Counterfeiting,
16 J. HIGH TECH. L. 340, 348 (2016); Marian, Blockchain Haves and the Need for Their
Internationally Coordinated Regulation, supra note 1, at 532; Marian, Are Cryptocurrencies Super
Tax Havens?, supra note 1, at 38–39; Viswanathan, supra note 1, at 283; Sarah Gruber, Note, Trust,
Identity and Disclosure: Are Bitcoin Exchanges the Next Virtual Havens for Money Laundering
and Tax Evasion, 32 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 135, 206 (2013); Edgar G. Sanchez, Note, CryptoCurrencies: The 21st Century’s Money Laundering and Tax Havens, 28 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
167, 168–69 (2017); Thomas Slattery, Note, Taking a Bit Out of Crime: Bitcoin and Cross-Border
Tax Evasion, 39 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 829, 831 (2014).
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technically savvy whistleblowers to scour the blockchain and determine
identities that correspond to public Bitcoin addresses selected by the IRS.
Techniques of gamification might draw a large, diverse population of potential
whistleblowers into the effort, and the IRS’s program could signal its
commitment to improving tax compliance in this area to the public.
I. BITCOIN AND THE THREAT OF TAX NONCOMPLIANCE
A.

The Origins and Mechanics of Bitcoin

In late 2008, 26 an individual or group relying on the pseudonym Satoshi
Nakamoto 27 proposed a peer-to-peer form of electronic cash known as Bitcoin. 28
Nakamoto’s proposal first circulated in a whitepaper on a cryptography mailing
list. 29 In it, Nakamoto described the use of digital signatures and a peer-to-peer
network that could contain an immutable public history of transactions, the latter
of which would solve the double-spending problem that digital forms of money
often faced before Bitcoin. 30 The double-spending problem arises because
people can copy digital units of cash and spend them more than once absent
special safeguards. 31
Nakamoto defined an electronic coin in Bitcoin as a “chain of digital
signatures.” 32 The coins are transmitted partly in reliance on a mathematical
operation known as a hash function. A hash function is an efficiently
computable, mathematical function which produces an output of a fixed size
even though the input can be a string of any size. 33 A transferor can transmit
Bitcoin by digitally signing a hash of the previous transaction and the public
26. NATHANIEL POPPER, DIGITAL GOLD: BITCOIN AND THE INSIDE STORY OF THE MISFITS
3–4 (2015).
27. Id. Though most describe “Satoshi Nakamoto” as a pseudonym, at least one journalist has
argued that the name of the inventor of Bitcoin really is Satoshi Nakamoto. Leah McGrath
Goodman, The Face Behind Bitcoin, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 6, 2014, 6:05 AM), https://www.news
week.com/2014/03/14/face-behind-Bitcoin-247957.html [https://perma.cc/E3AV-AU7A] (“Far
from leading to a Tokyo-based whiz kid using the name “Satoshi Nakamoto” as a cipher or
pseudonym (a story repeated by everyone from Bitcoin’s rabid fans to The New Yorker), the trail
followed by Newsweek led to a 64-year-old Japanese-American man whose name really is Satoshi
Nakamoto.”).
28. Bitcoin Whitepaper, supra note 4, at 8.
29. POPPER, supra note 26, at 20.
30. Bitcoin Whitepaper, supra note 4, at 1.
31. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 7, at xiv (“I can [pass around banknotes] electronically
with digital signatures, but that runs into the annoying ‘double spending’ problem—if you receive
a piece of data representing a unit of virtual cash, you can make two (or more) copies of it and pass
it on to different people.”).
32. Bitcoin Whitepaper, supra note 4, at 2.
33. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 2. Cryptographically secure hash functions possess
additional characteristics. Id. (noting that for a hash function to be cryptographically secure, it must
have “three additional properties: (1) collision-resistance, (2) hiding, and (3) puzzle-friendliness”).
AND MILLIONAIRES TRYING TO REINVENT MONEY
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key—basically, a payment address—of the next owner, which is added to the
end of “the coin.” 34
At heart, Bitcoin serves as a payment mechanism that is native to the
Internet. 35 It is both a unit of currency and a network, 36 and one is inseparable
from the other. Because Nakamoto designed Bitcoin to be peer-to-peer and
electronic, Bitcoin does not require parties transacting on the internet to go
through a financial institution or other centralized intermediary. 37
Perhaps most importantly, Nakamoto proposed a method for a secure, public
history of transactions. 38 This solved the double-spending problem in some
electronic cash systems whereby a single digital token might be fraudulently
spent more than once. Specifically, Nakamoto proposed a public ledger that
would operate across a decentralized system of computers. 39 Nakamoto’s
system incentivizes participating computers or nodes to expend computational
power to satisfy a so-called proof-of-work and thereby secure the public
transactional history. 40 Nodes that the Bitcoin community terms “miners”
compete to solve computational problems or puzzles required to publish blocks,
and then receive Bitcoin if they succeed. 41 Because these computational puzzles
are difficult, a valid block proves or demonstrates that a node has expended
computational power. 42 For that reason, false transactions cannot make it into
the valid blockchain in the long run provided honest nodes control the majority
of computational power in the network, 43 as I explain further below.
According to Nakamoto, the system operates based on the following steps. 44
First, new transactions are broadcast to all nodes. 45 Second, each node collects
new transactions into a block. 46 Third, each node works on solving a
computational puzzle to put the transactions in a block in a form that is

34. Bitcoin Whitepaper, supra note 4, at 2.
35. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 7, at ix.
36. Though by convention Bitcoin with a capital B refers to the network and bitcoin with a
lowercase b refers to the unit of currency, this Article capitalizes Bitcoin throughout for purposes
of consistency.
37. Bitcoin Whitepaper, supra note 4, at 1.
38. Id. at 2–4; Arvind Narayanan & Jeremy Clark, Bitcoin’s Academic Pedigree, 60 COMM.
OF THE ACM 36, 36 (noting that the ledger, the starting point for understanding Bitcoin, “is a place
to record all transactions that happen in the system, and it is open to and trusted by all system
participants.”).
39. Bitcoin Whitepaper, supra note 4, at 2.
40. Id. at 3.
41. Id. at 4.
42. Id. at 3.
43. Id. (“If a majority of CPU power is controlled by honest nodes, the honest chain will grow
the fastest and outpace any competing chains.”).
44. Bitcoin Whitepaper, supra note 4, at 3.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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acceptable to all nodes. 47 Fourth, the node that first succeeds in solving the
computational puzzle broadcasts the block to all nodes. 48 Fifth, nodes accept the
block only if all transactions in it are valid and not already spent. 49 Finally, nodes
express their acceptance of the block by working on creating the next block in
the chain and use a hash of the accepted block as part of the next block. 50 Thus,
Nakamoto offers the following view of the blockchain:

GRAPHIC OF BLOCKCHAIN FROM BITCOIN WHITEPAPER 51
The “nonce” in the diagram above is a term of art from cryptography; for present
purposes, one might think of it as the answer to the computational puzzle posed
to the miners. 52
Importantly, nodes consider the longest chain to be the valid one and work
towards extending it. 53 Though a dishonest node or attacker could conceivably
publish a block that contains a false transaction, the system would eventually
reject such a block as the majority of computational power is directed towards
building a chain of blocks which contain all valid transactions and is therefore
the longest chain that such a system would produce. 54 Put simply, Bitcoin
operates on the idea that the blockchain consisting of the most blocks represents
the most aggregated computational effort. 55 Thus, false transactions cannot
make it onto the valid blockchain in a permanent way provided honest nodes
control the majority of computational power in the network; the latter condition
ensures that the longest blockchain is eventually the one which contains all valid
transactions.
Those mining nodes which adequately satisfy the proof-of-work and
broadcast a block receive Bitcoin, which enter into circulation at a

47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Bitcoin Whitepaper, supra note 4, at 3.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 7 (“In cryptography, the term nonce is used to
refer to a value that can only be used once.”).
53. Bitcoin Whitepaper, supra note 4, at 3 (“Nodes always consider the longest chain to be the
correct one and will keep working on extending it.”).
54. Id. at 3, 6–8.
55. See DRESCHER, supra note 18, at 168 (“The longest-chain-criterion is based on the idea
that the blockchain-data-structure that comprises the most blocks represents the most aggregated
computational effort.”).
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predetermined pace. 56 After twenty-one million Bitcoin enter into circulation in
total, Nakamoto proposed that the system operate entirely on transaction fees. 57
Bitcoin has been characterized as a brilliant arrangement of incentives and
proof-of-work to secure a public ledger and thereby solve the double-spending
problem. 58
But it, like most cryptocurrencies, faces certain hurdles regarding
scalability. In particular, the transaction records known as blocks are limited in
size and frequency by design in Bitcoin, so the network as currently constituted
faces certain limitations as to the number of transactions per second it can
process. Specifically, the size of blocks in Bitcoin is limited to one megabyte
per ten minutes, which allows a current maximum of seven transactions per
second. 59 For purposes of comparison, Visa states that its network can handle
24,000 transactions per second. 60 The limitation on transactions per second has
resulted in delays in processing and confirming Bitcoin transactions, such that
users pay fees to miners to prioritize confirmation of their transactions. 61
B.

Taxability of Bitcoin

In 2014, the IRS published its position on the basic tax treatment of
transactions using cryptocurrency. 62 In short, general tax principles that apply to
56. Bitcoin Whitepaper, supra note 4, at 4.
57. Id.; E-mail from, Satoshi Nakamoto, creator of Bitcoin, to The Cryptography Mailing List
(Jan. 8, 2009, 14:27 EST) http://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2009-January/014
994.html [https://perma.cc/P2T4-527G]. In the whitepaper, Nakamoto also offered details about
reclaiming disk space, simplified payment verification, the mechanism for combining and splitting
value, privacy, and certain calculations to show the practical impossibility that an attacker could
prevail in creating an alternate chain. Bitcoin Whitepaper, supra note 4, at 4–8.
58. Narayanan & Clark, supra note 38, at 42 (“Nakamoto’s genius, then, was not any of the
individual components of bitcoin, but rather the intricate way in which they fit together to breathe
life into the system.”).
59. DAVID GERARD, ATTACK OF THE 50 FOOT BLOCKCHAIN: BITCOIN, BLOCKCHAIN,
ETHEREUM AND SMART CONTRACTS 69 (2017); see also Kyle Croman et al., On Scaling
Decentralized Blockchains: A Position Paper, FIN. CRYPTOGRAPHY AND DATA SEC. 106, 108
(2016), https://www.comp.nus.edu.sg/~prateeks/papers/Bitcoin-scaling.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5X
Q-TTFH] (“The maximum throughput is the maximum rate at which the blockchain can confirm
transactions. Today, Bitcoin’s maximum throughput is 3.3–7 transactions/sec. This number is
constrained by the maximum block size and the inter-block time.”).
60. Visa Acceptance for Retailers, VISA, https://usa.visa.com/run-your-business/small-busi
ness-tools/retail.html [https://perma.cc/Q4YY-4HR9] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019) (“VisaNet . . . is
capable of handling more than 24,000 transactions per second.”).
61. GERARD, supra note 59, at 69.
62. I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2014-1 C.B. 938 (Mar. 2014), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n14-21.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AZ5-22BM]. Multiple pieces summarize the brief IRS notice. See
generally Jose Andre Roman, Bitcoin: Assessing the Tax Implications Associated with the IRS’s
Notice Deeming Virtual Currencies Property, 34 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 451 (2015); Sarah-Jane
Morin, Tax Aspects of Cryptocurrency, 64 THE PRACTICAL L. 21, 22 (Feb. 2018); Deidre A. Liedel,
The Taxation of Bitcoin: How the IRS Views Cryptocurrencies, 66 DRAKE L. REV. 107 (2018);
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property transactions apply to transactions in which cryptocurrency is used. 63
For US federal tax purposes, cryptocurrency cannot generate foreign currency
gain or loss. 64 Thus, unsurprisingly, the gain derived from investing in Bitcoin
is subject to federal income tax. 65 The use of appreciated Bitcoin in transactions
and proceeds from mining it will also result in taxable gain. 66
The IRS will issue additional guidelines on the taxation of cryptocurrency
shortly. 67 These additional guidelines will likely address the tax treatment of
cryptocurrency hard forks, 68 and acceptable methods for the calculation and
assignment of cost basis. 69
C. Previous Characterizations of Bitcoin in Tax Scholarship
In light of the way the Bitcoin network is proposed to function in the Bitcoin
Whitepaper, it is understandable that tax scholars have characterized Bitcoin as
a serious threat to the existing tax system. In 2013, Omri Marian suggested
governments had failed to identify the acuteness of the potential problem that
cryptocurrencies could replace tax havens as the weapon-of-choice for purposes
of tax evasion. 70 Marian writes,
Cryptocurrencies possess the traditional characteristics of tax havens: earnings
are not subject to taxation and taxpayers’ anonymity is maintained.
Cryptocurrencies, however, also possess one added value: their operation is not

Nika Antonikova, Note, Real Taxes on Virtual Currencies: What Does the I.R.S. Say, 34 VA. TAX
REV. 433 (2015) (summarizing and also criticizing the Notice). At least two pieces outlined some
of the relevant considerations regarding the taxation of Bitcoin before the release of Notice 201421. Howard Wiener et al., Chomping at the Bit: U.S. Federal Income Taxation of Bitcoin
Transactions, 11 J. TAX’N FIN. PRODS. 35, 36–37 (2013); Benjamin W. Akins et al., A Whole New
World: Income Tax Considerations of the Bitcoin Economy, 12 PITT. TAX REV. 25, 38–39 (2014).
63. I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, supra note 62, at 2.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 2–3, 4.
67. Letter from Charles P. Rettig, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service, Department of
the Treasury, to Tom Emmer, Representative, United States House of Representatives (May 16,
2019), https://coincenter.org/link/the-irs-has-told-congress-that-it-will-issue-new-cryptocurrencytax-guidance-soon [https://perma.cc/E2JB-U6H2].
68. See generally ABA Section of Taxation, Comments on the Tax Treatment of Hard Forks
(2018), as reprinted in 72 THE TAX LAW. 27–38 (2018). At a high level, a hard fork constitutes a
change in the rules by which a cryptocurrency operates, but is a change to which only some of the
network’s nodes subscribe. A hard fork has the potential to divide a cryptocurrency network in such
a way that those who owned a particular cryptocurrency before the change in protocol are deemed
to also possess an equivalent amount of an alternative cryptocurrency on a discrete blockchain after
the fork. Nick Thieme, Bitcoin Has Split Into Two Cryptocurrencies. What, Exactly, Does That
Mean?, SLATE (Aug. 4, 2017), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2017/08/04/explaining_
bitcoin_s_split_into_two_cryptocurrencies.html [https://perma.cc/9HNH-SBBP].
69. Letter from Charles P. Rettig, supra note 67.
70. Marian, Are Cryptocurrencies Super Tax Havens?, supra note 1, at 38.
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dependent on the existence of financial institutions. Thus, cryptocurrencies
could potentially defeat governments’ recent successes in addressing offshore
tax evasion. To the extent that cryptocurrencies continue to gain momentum, we
could reasonably expect tax-evaders—who traditionally executed their taxevasion techniques through the use of offshore bank accounts in tax-haven
jurisdictions—to opt out of traditional tax havens in favor of cryptocurrencies. 71

Marian was writing at a time before the IRS had published its official position
on cryptocurrency.
In 2014, the IRS released its guidance stating general tax principles that
apply to property transactions also apply to Bitcoin transactions. Three student
notes criticize the Notice on the basis that this rule undercuts the transactional
utility of Bitcoin as a currency. 72
In 2016, in the evocatively titled piece, Is Bitcoin Rat Poison?
Cryptocurrency, Crime, and Counterfeiting, Eric Engle argued that U.S.
regulators should ban cryptocurrencies because they enable crime, threaten
national security, and are a scam. 73 Tax evasion was one of the crimes; Engle
relied on Marian’s piece to assert that Bitcoin serves as a tool for tax evasion. 74
In 2018, Manoj Viswanathan described the potential for blockchain
technology to enable tax evasion. 75 Viswanathan outlines the importance of
information from centralized intermediaries to tax compliance, 76 and
characterizes blockchain as a technology with the potential to eliminate the need
for centralized intermediaries. 77 Thus, he contends that transactions on
decentralized platforms and movement away from centralized intermediaries
would result in dramatically reduced tax reporting oversight. 78 Viswanathan,
however, acknowledges that entry and exit points from the blockchain
infrastructure can be regulated, offering the example of the point at which funds
are transmitted from a bank. 79

71. Id. at 39.
72. Sam Hampton, Note, Undermining Bitcoin, 11 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 331, 331
(2016); Roland Weekley, Note, The Problematic Tax Treatment of Cryptocurrencies, 17 FLA. ST.
U. BUS. REV. 109, 110 (2018); Scott A. Wiseman, Note, Property or Currency? The Tax Dilemma
Behind Bitcoin, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 417, 419 (2016).
73. Engle, supra note 25, at 356 (2016) (“This article argues that the U.S. . . . should simply
seek to ban cryptocurrencies because distributed encrypted currency enables a wide range of grave
crimes, threatens U.S. national security, and because cryptocurrency is more or less a scam.”).
74. Id. at 378–79, 379 n.248.
75. Viswanathan, supra note 1, at 325.
76. Id. at 332.
77. Id. at 320 (“For any network in which participants currently rely on a trusted third party
(such as a bank) to confirm the legitimacy of transactions, blockchain technology has the potential
to eliminate the need for the centralized intermediary providing the verification.”).
78. Id. at 323.
79. Id. at 327–28.
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Cryptocurrency and the Shifting IRS Enforcement Model, a 2018 piece,
contains a practitioner’s predictions regarding the IRS’s future approach to
cryptocurrency tax enforcement. 80 Shapiro offers ways that an enforcement
model, similar to the voluntary disclosure program that the IRS put in place with
respect to Americans with undeclared Swiss bank accounts, may work in
important ways with respect to cryptocurrency. 81
In a 2019 article, Marian argues that jurisdictions traditionally considered
tax havens are becoming hubs for blockchain-based ventures. 82 He contends that
the decentralization and tamper-resistance of blockchain technologies render
traditional anti-tax haven policies ineffective and calls for coordinated
international regulation. 83
Three student notes contain the same characterization of Bitcoin as a tool
for tax evasion and offer preliminary solutions to this problem. 84 One student
piece criticizes Magistrate Judge Corley’s decision to grant the IRS’s petition to
enforce a so-called John Doe summons on Coinbase, the largest domestic digital
asset exchange, 85 which is a decision that Part II addresses at length.
II. HOW BITCOIN’S ECOSYSTEM CAN FACILITATE TAX COMPLIANCE
This Part argues that Bitcoin is increasingly regulable for tax purposes due
to its emerging ecosystem. Bitcoin’s peer-to-peer, decentralized, pseudonymous
design, as outlined in the Whitepaper, might suggest it is a Wild West when it
comes to tax compliance, considering compliance relies on a robust structure of
information reporting and withholding by intermediaries. 86 Bitcoin, however,
does not operate in a vacuum. This Part outlines the emergence and growth of a
rich commercial and technical ecosystem that operates with Bitcoin. The case
involving the IRS’s John Doe summons on Coinbase shows how this ecosystem
can facilitate tax compliance. Theory about the regulation of the internet helps
structure this argument.
80. Dashiell C. Shapiro, Cryptocurrency and the Shifting IRS Enforcement Model, 1 STAN. J.
BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y 1, 1 (2018), https://stanford-jblp.pubpub.org/pub/crypto-irs-enforcement
[https://perma.cc/BXF3-HC7R].
81. Id.
82. Marian, Blockchain Haves and the Need for Their Internationally Coordinated
Regulation, supra note 1, at 529.
83. Id.
84. Gruber, supra note 25, at 169 (arguing that Bitcoin poses serious questions related to tax
reporting); Sanchez, supra note 25, at 189 (describing Bitcoin as an anonymous ledger which leaves
no paper trail by which the IRS Criminal Investigation Unit can investigate individuals committing
money laundering and tax evasion); Slattery, supra note 25, at 831 (arguing that serious concerns
about tax evasion with Bitcoin can be addressed by self-reporting requirements and a multilateral
tax agreement).
85. Austin Elliott, Note, Collection of Cryptocurrency Customer-Information: Tax
Enforcement Mechanism or Invasion of Privacy?, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, 1 (2017).
86. See Lederman, supra note 5, at 697; Viswanathan, supra note 1, at 333.
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The Regulation of the Internet as Theoretical Background

Bitcoin invites comparisons to the early internet, 87 and legal scholarship on
the regulability of the internet illuminates how tax authorities can increasingly
police Bitcoin despite characterizations to the contrary. In 1999, Lawrence
Lessig argued in the first edition of Code against the then common view that the
internet was beyond the reach of real-space regulation. 88 That view famously
found a voice in John Perry Barlow’s “Declaration of Independence for
Cyberspace”:
Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come
from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of
the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no
sovereignty where we gather. 89

Legal scholars David Johnson and David Post expressed a related proposition in
1996:
The rise of an electronic medium that disregards geographical boundaries throws
the law into disarray by creating entirely new phenomena that need to become
the subject of clear legal rules but that cannot be governed, satisfactorily, by any
current territorially based sovereign. 90

Lessig challenged this position with a prescient argument that the internet was
not only regulable, but uniquely so. 91
Part of Lessig’s argument involved close attention to the way in which
governmental regulation benefits from commercial efforts on the internet. As
Lessig described of the internet, users oftentimes cede privacy and autonomy for
the sake of convenience and utility. He writes,
Commerce has done its part—for commerce, and indirectly, for governments.
Technologies that make commerce more efficient are also technologies that
make regulation simpler. The one supports the other. There are a host of
technologies now that make it easier to know who someone is on the Net, what
they’re doing, and where they’re doing it. These technologies were built to make

87. See, e.g., Jon Russell, Coinbase Plots to Become the New York Stock Exchange of Crypto
Securities, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 7, 2018, 6:27 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/09/07/coinbaseplots-to-become-the-new-york-stock-exchange-of-crypto-securities/ [https://perma.cc/S3BK-8N
QA] (quoting Coinbase CEO Brian Armstrong saying, “Web 1.0 was about publishing information,
web 2.0 was about interaction and web 3.0 is going to be about value transfer on the internet because
now the web has this native currency and so applications can be built that instantly tap into this
global economy on the internet . . . .”).
88. LESSIG, supra note 16, at ix.
89. Reprinted in id. at 3.
90. David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1375 (1996).
91. LESSIG, supra note 16, at 23–24.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

194

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:181

business work better. They make life on the Internet safer. But the by-product
of these technologies is to make the Net more regulable. 92

Lessig clarified that more regulable does not mean, of course, perfectly
regulable. 93
Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu continued Lessig’s line of argument in Who
Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless World, in which they
documented the way in which the internet came to be a technology that
facilitated the enforcement of laws rather than resisting territorial law. 94 The
internet’s ascendance did not eliminate intermediaries, as some believed it
would, but just changed who served as intermediaries. 95 Wu and Goldsmith
noted the practical difficulty of eliminating intermediaries altogether. 96
Certain scholars have come to similar insights regarding blockchain. In
2014, Andy Yee framed the Bitcoin ecosystem in terms of the layered model of
internet architecture. 97 Yee argued that intermediaries in the information layer—
the layer of actors who interface between the technical community and real
economy—are appropriate targets of state regulation. 98 Primavera De Filippi
and Aaron Wright extensively rely on Lessig in outlining intermediaries that
may be subject to regulation in the context of blockchain. 99 These include new
businesses and services built on top of blockchain, miners, internet service
providers, and information intermediaries such as search engines and social
networks. 100
B.

The IRS’s John Doe Summons on Coinbase

The IRS’s John Doe summons on the largest domestic digital asset
exchange 101 and wallet provides an important illustration of the mechanics of
how Bitcoin is increasingly regulable for tax purposes. Examples of different
kinds of emerging commercial and technical intermediaries show how this
process might unfold. These entities and networks collect customer information
as a commercial necessity and, in some cases, as a legal requirement; they can
92. Id. at 61.
93. Id.
94. GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 19, at 10 (“The Yahoo story encapsulates the Internet’s
transformation from a technology that resists territorial law to one that facilitates its enforcement.”).
95. Id. at 70 (“The rise of networking did not eliminate intermediaries, but rather changed who
they are.”).
96. Id.
97. Yee, supra note 20, at 1.
98. Id. at 4–5.
99. DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 18, at 173.
100. Id. at 177–81.
101. Declaration of David Utzke in Support of Petition to Enforce Internal Revenue Service
Summons at 5, United States v. Coinbase, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-01431-JSC (N.D. Cal. 2017) (Dkt. No.
1-1) (“Additional research on Coinbase shows that in the 30-day period ending December 14, 2015,
Coinbase was . . . the largest exchanger in the U.S. of bitcoin into U.S. dollars.”).
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remit relevant tax information to the authorities. That information includes legal
identity and transaction details.
These commercial and technical efforts on the Bitcoin “base layer” make it
far more usable to consumers and merchants. Many customers and merchants
relinquish some of the theoretical pseudonymity of operating at the base layer to
take advantage of these technologies, just as users of the internet might cede
privacy and autonomy for convenience and utility.
Coinbase offers a broad set of functions to customers. Coinbase, as of
December 2015, offered an online wallet 102 for Bitcoin storage and transactions,
an exchange for trading cryptocurrency, an application programming interface
for developers and merchants to build applications and accept Bitcoin payments,
and a Visa-branded debit card that enables Coinbase users in the US to spend
Bitcoin where Visa is accepted. 103 Bitcoin exchanges accept deposits in fiat
currency or Bitcoin, enable users to make or receive Bitcoin payments, and, most
importantly, allow users to exchange Bitcoin for fiat currency or vice versa. 104
These exchange transactions do not occur on Bitcoin’s blockchain; a user is
merely matched with someone who is willing to be on “the other side” of the
transaction. 105 The majority of those who buy or trade Bitcoin rely on digital
asset exchanges and, by and large, cede a significant amount of privacy to do
so. 106
1.

Legal Background

The IRS has several important tools when it suspects tax evasion by a group.
To accomplish its mandate to ascertain the correctness of tax returns and to
determine a taxpayer’s tax liability, the Service has the authority to examine
relevant records and summon taxpayers or third parties who may have such
records. 107
102. As stated above, spending Bitcoin requires knowledge of a public key and a private key,
the latter of which should remain secret. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 76. Key management
might simply involve storing keys on one’s local device; this would typically involve wallet
software that keeps track of coins, manages the details of keys, and offers a convenient user
interface. Id. at 77. An online wallet is similar to a local wallet, but information is stored in the
cloud; convenience is the advantage of an online wallet as it does not require the installation of any
special software. Id. at 88 (“A big advantage [of an online wallet] is that it’s convenient.”).
103. United States’ Memorandum in Support of Ex Parte Petition for Leave to Serve John Doe
Summons at 5–6, In re Tax Liabs. Of John Does, No. 3:16-cv-06658-JSC (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2016)
(Dkt. No. 2) (“As of December 2015, Coinbase has four main products: (1) an exchange for trading
bitcoin and fiat currency . . . ; (2) a wallet for bitcoin storage and transactions; (3) an application
programming interface (API) for developers and merchants to build applications and accept bitcoin
payments; and (4) ‘Shift Card,’ the first U.S.-issued bitcoin debit card.”).
104. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 88–89.
105. Id.
106. See Part II.C.1 below.
107. 26 U.S.C. § 7602(a) (2012).
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The Service may issue a so-called John Doe summons, which does not
specifically identify the taxpayer under investigation, provided it meets certain
requirements. 108 Specifically, the Service must establish that: (1) the summons
relates to the investigation of a particular person or ascertainable group of
people; (2) there is a reasonable basis for believing that the person or group may
have failed to comply with any provision of the tax law; and (3) the information
sought is not readily available from other sources. 109 Before such a summons
can be served, it must be approved for service by a district court in an ex parte
proceeding. 110 The IRS famously employed a John Doe summons in 2008 when
it sought the names of thousands of US taxpayers who held UBS accounts in
Switzerland and who allegedly failed to meet tax obligations. 111
2.

The Government’s Case Against Coinbase

On November 17, 2016, the Department of Justice petitioned the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California for an order
authorizing the IRS to serve a John Doe summons on Coinbase for information
related to users who entered into cryptocurrency transactions in 2013 through
2015. 112 In the memorandum supporting the petition, the government contended
that the IRS was concerned U.S. taxpayers were underreporting taxable income
from virtual currency transactions. 113 The government pointed to purported
anonymity and lack of third-party reporting in virtual currency transactions. 114
To further the IRS’s investigation into the identities of U.S. taxpayers who
had failed to report virtual currency transactions, the government sought
information regarding U.S. persons who conducted transactions in virtual
currency between 2013 and 2015. 115 The summons requested nine categories of
documents including complete user profiles, know-your-customer due diligence,
documents regarding third-party access, transaction logs, records of payments
processed, correspondence between Coinbase and Coinbase users, account or
invoice statements, records of payments, and exception records produced by
Coinbase’s anti-money-laundering system. 116 On November 30, 2016, the court

108. 26 U.S.C. § 7609(f) (2012).
109. Id.
110. 26 U.S.C. § 7609(h)(2) (2012).
111. Beckett G. Cantley, The UBS Case: The U.S. Attack on Swiss Banking Sovereignty, 7 BYU
INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 1, 18 (2011).
112. United States’ Ex Parte Petition for Leave to Serve “John Doe” Summons at 1–2, In re
Tax Liabs. Of John Does, No. 3:16-cv-06658-JSC (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2016) (Dkt. No. 1).
113. United States’ Memorandum in Support of Ex Parte Petition for Leave to Serve John Doe
Summons, supra note 103, at 2.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 9.
116. Id.
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granted the Government’s petition for leave to serve the John Doe summons on
Coinbase. 117
In late 2016, Coinbase posted a statement on its blog regarding the summons
which read, in part:
Although Coinbase’s general practice is to cooperate with properly targeted law
enforcement inquiries, we are extremely concerned with the indiscriminate
breadth of the government’s request. Our customers’ privacy rights are
important to us and our legal team is in the process of examining the
government’s petition. In its current form, we will oppose the government’s
petition in court. 118

Coinbase’s legal counsel made similar comments around the same time. 119
Coinbase refused to comply with the IRS’s summons, and the government
filed a petition to enforce the summons on March 16, 2017. 120 In support of the
petition to enforce the summons, the government submitted a declaration from
a senior revenue agent at the IRS who was assigned to virtual currency
matters. 121 He stated that only 800 to 900 persons electronically filed a required
form regarding dispositions of capital assets with a property description “likely
related to Bitcoin” in each of the years 2013 through 2015. 122 The government
contended that Coinbase claimed to have had 500,000 users during the summons
period. 123
After the court heard argument on a motion to quash the summons and a
motion to intervene, and eight months after the government served the initial
summons, the Service narrowed its request. 124 Specifically, the IRS only sought
information regarding accounts “with at least the equivalent of $20,000 in any
117. Order Granting Ex Parte Petition for Leave to Serve “John Doe” Summons at 2, In re Tax
Liabs. Of John Does, No. 3:16-cv-06658-JSC (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2016) (Dkt. No. 7).
118. Protecting Customer Privacy, THE COINBASE BLOG (Nov. 18, 2016), https://blog.coin
base.com/protecting-customer-privacy-ec7e0e1c4d53 [https://perma.cc/E4SA-SLWP].
119. Nathaniel Popper, Bitcoin Users Who Evade Taxes Are Sought by the I.R.S., N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/19/business/dealbook/irs-is-seeking-tax-evad
ers-who-use-bitcoin.html [https://perma.cc/SG5B-24R5] (“‘We want to work with law
enforcement—that’s generally our policy,’ the company’s head legal counsel, Juan Suarez, said
Friday. ‘But we can’t tolerate sweeping fishing expeditions. We are very concerned about the
financial privacy rights of our customers.’”).
120. United States’ Petition to Enforce Internal Revenue Service Summons at 1–2, United
States v. Coinbase, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-01431-JSC (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2017) (Dkt. No. 1).
121. Declaration of David Utzke in Support of Petition to Enforce Internal Revenue Service
Summons at 2, United States v. Coinbase, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-01431-JSC (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2017)
(Dkt. No. 3).
122. Id. at 4, ¶ 13.
123. United States’ Response to Coinbase Inc.’s Opposition to Petition to Enforce Internal
Revenue Service Summons at 7, United States v. Coinbase, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-01431-JSC (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 1, 2017) (Dkt. No. 65).
124. United States’ Notice of Narrowed Summons Requests for Enforcement at 2, United States
v. Coinbase, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-01431-JSC (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2017) (Dkt. No. 37).
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one transaction type (buy, sell, send, or receive) in any one year during the 2013–
15 period.” 125 The narrowed summons did not include users who only bought
and held Bitcoin during the 2013–15 period and those for whom Coinbase had
filed 1099-Ks—information returns regarding transactions settled through thirdparty payment networks which are required to be filed where the total amount
of the transactions exceeds $20,000 and the total number of transactions exceeds
200. 126 The Service sought account records, records of know-your-customer
diligence, all records of account activity, correspondence between Coinbase and
the user, periodic statements of account or invoices, and agreements or
instructions granting third parties access, control, or transaction approval
authority. 127
Coinbase refused to comply with the narrowed summons and opposed the
government’s petition to enforce the John Doe summons. 128 In its order on the
petition to enforce the John Doe summons, the court held that the government
had met its minimal burden to show that the narrowed summons satisfied a
legitimate investigative purpose, but reduced the scope of the records covered to
those which it considered relevant to the threshold question of whether there was
taxable gain in Bitcoin transactions. Thus, the court granted the petition to
enforce the summons with respect to limited information regarding the
taxpayers, records of account activity, and all periodic statements of account.
Finally, the court concluded that Coinbase had failed to meet their heavy burden
to show an abuse of process on the Service’s part. 129
The conclusion of the litigation regarding the Service’s John Doe summons
on Coinbase is not surprising. The IRS demonstrated that relatively few
taxpayers had properly accounted for Bitcoin transactions in 2013 to 2015, and
so the IRS used a traditional, court-sanctioned method to gather more
information regarding noncompliant taxpayers from the largest domestic digital
currency exchange. Though Coinbase and others argued the summons was
overbroad, the Service subsequently limited it to cases of material
125. Id. at 2, ¶ 2.
126. 26 U.S.C. § 6050W(e) (2012).
127. United States’ Notice of Narrowed Summons Requests for Enforcement, supra note 124,
at 2.
128. Respondent Coinbase, Inc.’s Opposition to Petition to Enforce Internal Revenue Service
Summons at 1, United States v. Coinbase, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-01431-JSC (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2017)
(Dkt. No. 46). Another party, with the court’s permission, anonymously opposed the petition to
enforce. Intervenor John Doe 4’s Opposition to Petition to Enforce Internal Revenue Service
Summons, United States v. Coinbase, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-01431-JSC (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2017) (Dkt.
No. 44). Three organizations, the Competitive Enterprise Institute, the Coin Center, and the Digital
Currency and Ledger Defense Coalition, filed amici briefs in opposition to the Service’s petition to
enforce the John Doe summons. Motions to File Amicus Curiae Briefs, United States v. Coinbase,
Inc., No. 3:17-cv-01431-JSC (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2017) (Dkt. Nos. 50, 52, and 54).
129. Order re Petition to Enforce IRS Summons at 13–14, United States v. Coinbase, Inc., No.
3:17-cv-01431-JSC (N.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2017) (Dkt. No. 78).
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noncompliance about which it had no information, and the court limited the
precise records to be delivered based on relevance. In this way, Coinbase did not
have to divulge information about all or most customers during 2013 to 2015
and could respectably maintain the position that it sought to ensure client privacy
and, to a limited extent, succeeded in doing so. In short, the IRS got information
regarding significant potential tax cheats, and Coinbase saved face, in part,
regarding privacy; Coinbase was not legally compelled to be transparent to tax
authorities.
Now, the IRS is using data from the summons to direct enforcement
actions. 130 The Service has sent letters to taxpayers suspected of not properly
reporting cryptocurrency transactions. 131 The letter informs taxpayers they may
be subject to civil or criminal enforcement actions if they do not accurately
report their cryptocurrency transactions. 132
The Coinbase case demonstrates that commercial endeavors have resulted
in an infrastructure around the Bitcoin network which can facilitate IRS
enforcement actions. The race, unsuccessful thus far, to create a Bitcoin
exchange-traded fund offers another view of the way in which commercial
efforts around the Bitcoin network indirectly facilitate the growing regulability
of Bitcoin by tax authorities.
C. Emerging Intermediaries
1.

The Bitcoin Over-the-Counter Market and a Proposed Bitcoin ETF

The development of a Bitcoin exchange-traded fund (“ETF”) offers another
example of commercial efforts that might result in a repository of relevant
transaction information regarding markets in Bitcoin—information upon which
tax authorities might rely. An ETF allows investors to enter and exit positions
promptly throughout the trading day and to do so at little cost. 133 ETFs offer
“seemingly endless combinations of asset classes, investment strategies, and
long, short, and inverse exposures.” 134

130. Allyson Versprille, IRS Targets Crypto Users Who May Have Misreported Transactions,
BLOOMBERG L. NEWS (July 17, 2019, 5:07 PM), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-re
port/irs-targets-crypto-users-who-may-have-misreported-transactions [https://perma.cc/KQ8N-3J
BY ] (“IRS officials have recently said they’re using data from the summons to direct the agency’s
enforcement actions.”).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Henry T.C. Hu & John D. Morley, A Regulatory Framework for Exchange-Traded Funds,
91 S. CAL. L. REV. 839, 851 (2018) (“ETFs allow investors not only to enter and exit positions
nearly instantaneously throughout the trading day, but, critically, to also do so at little cost—that
is, at a trading price nearly equal to the NAV of the shares.”).
134. Id.
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Multiple parties seek to deliver the first Bitcoin ETF. In 2016, one US
equities exchange—the Bats BZX Exchange 135—sought to list an exchangetraded fund consisting of shares of the Winklevoss Bitcoin Trust. 136 The SEC
rejected the Bats BZX Exchange’s application to list shares of the Winklevoss
Bitcoin Trust because of, in short, the alleged potential for fraud and
manipulation in Bitcoin markets on digital asset exchanges. 137 More precisely,
the SEC determined that the exchange had not met its burden to show the
proposal was consistent with the requirement under Exchange Act Section
6(b)(5) that the rules of a national securities exchange be designed “to prevent
fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices” and “to protect investors and the
public interest.” 138
Multiple exchanges have sought to list Bitcoin ETFs, including ones which
short Bitcoin, but as of this writing, no exchange has yet secured the SEC’s
approval. For example, in August of 2018, the SEC rejected proposals from
NYSE Arca and Cboe to list Bitcoin exchange-traded funds proposed by
ProShares, 139 Direxion, 140 and Granite Shares 141 in a staff decision; two days
later, the SEC stayed those rejections pending a review by the full
commission. 142
A recent proposal for a Bitcoin ETF, however, offers a view of how
commercial efforts might increasingly expose Bitcoin markets to regulatory
oversight. One exchange—Cboe—has proposed to list SolidX Bitcoin Shares
issued by the VanEck SolidX Bitcoin Trust. Though Cboe’s joint proposal with
VanEck and SolidX was withdrawn from consideration in January of 2019 due
to the government shutdown, the parties then resubmitted their joint proposal in
135. CBOE acquired Bats Global Markets in 2017. Robert Reed, CBOE Reaches for New
Heights with $3.4 Billion Deal for Bats Global Markets, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 1, 2017, 2:56 PM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-cboe-bats-merger-robert-reed-0302-biz-20170301column.html [https://perma.cc/8CBB-W5EY].
136. Self-Regulatory Organizations, Securities and Exchange Commission Release No. 3483723 at 1 (July 26, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2018/34-83723.pdf [https://perma.cc/
J9RQ-SGAC] [hereinafter Winklevoss ETF Rejection].
137. Id. at 11–12.
138. Id. at 1–6.
139. Self-Regulatory Organizations, Securities and Exchange Commission Release No. 3483904 at 1, 26 (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nysearca/2018/34-83904.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9USN-RC8Y].
140. Self-Regulatory Organizations, Securities and Exchange Commission Release No. 3483912 at 1, 24 (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nysearca/2018/34-83912.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UN3S-WVQ3].
141. Self-Regulatory Organizations, Securities and Exchange Commission Release No. 3483913 at 1, 33 (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/cboebzx/2018/34-83913.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ELV4-5BX9].
142. Tom Zanki, SEC to Reconsider Staff’s Rejection of 9 Bitcoin ETFs, LAW360 (August 24,
2018), https://www.law360.com/Articles/1076630/sec-to-reconsider-staff-s-rejection-of-9-bitcoin
-etfs [https://perma.cc/53Y7-LPV5].
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substantially similar form. 143 Cboe again withdrew its proposal in September of
2019, but continues to work with regulators and market participants to progress
towards a Bitcoin ETF. 144
Cboe’s joint proposal reflected, understandably, a Bitcoin ETF design
responsive to the SEC’s concerns set forth in the Winklevoss ETF Rejection. 145
Cboe’s proposal eschewed, to the extent possible, reliance on digital asset
exchanges, about whose manipulation the SEC was concerned. 146 Instead, the
ETF would have principally relied on the over-the-counter market for Bitcoin.
The large over-the-counter market in Bitcoin represents twenty-five to fifty
percent of the volume of Bitcoin traded in USD on USD-denominated Bitcoin
exchanges. 147 The application for the VanEck SolidX Bitcoin ETF describes the
over-the-counter market in Bitcoin as one conducted on a principal-to-principal
basis without a formal structure or open-outcry meeting place. 148 Parties who
engage in over-the-counter transactions will agree upon a price, often via phone
or email, and then enter into transactions. 149 The trust that would purchase
Bitcoin on behalf of the VanEck SolidX Bitcoin ETF intended to effect overthe-counter Bitcoin transactions with well-established institutions, who would
be subject to the VanEck SolidX Bitcoin Trust’s anti-money laundering and
know-your-customer compliance procedures. 150 The parties behind the VanEck
SolidX Bitcoin ETF contended that such principal-to-principal trading would
better resist manipulation in comparison to digital asset exchanges, and the
parties specified additional procedures that would minimize the possibility of
manipulation of the price of Bitcoin. 151
The parties seeking the approval of a Bitcoin ETF might be thought of as a
different type of innovator in Bitcoin’s ecosystem. Their innovation is not
143. Nikhilesh De, CBOE Resubmits the VanEck/SolidX Bitcoin ETF Proposal for SEC
Approval, COINDESK (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.coindesk.com/CBOE-re-files-vaneck-solidxbitcoin-etf-proposal [https://perma.cc/7UQV-5K68?type=image].
144. Joanna Ossinger, Bitcoin ETF Proposal to SEC Withdrew by Cboe, VanEck SolidX,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-18/cboe-with
draws-proposal-to-sec-on-vaneck-solidx-bitcoin-fund [https://perma.cc/CP4F-E6M7].
145. See Self-Regulatory Organizations, Securities and Exchange Commission Release No. 3483520 at 51 (June 26, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/cboebzx/2018/34-83520.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PNF6-SGJQ]; Self-Regulatory Organizations, Securities and Exchange
Commission Release No. 34-85119 at 5–6 (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/CBOEb
zx/2019/34-85119.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4BL-X93K]; Zanki, supra note 142 (“The fund’s
creators have sought to address SEC concerns about the danger such ETFs pose to retail investors,
including setting an estimated $200,000 share price in order to limit appeal to institutional
investors.”).
146. Securities and Exchange Commission Release No. 34-85119, supra note 145, at 5.
147. Id. at 18.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Securities and Exchange Commission Release No. 34-85119, supra note 145, at 20..
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technological in character, but constitutes a commercial advance that renders a
technology more usable; to succeed, their innovation must respond to and
effectively address iterations of regulatory rejections and hurdles. The
competition to deliver a Bitcoin exchange-traded fund is based on the
proposition that a broader set of institutional and retail investors are interested
in exposure to Bitcoin, but opt not to hold Bitcoin directly or transact via digital
asset exchanges because of investment rules, lack of technological savvy, risk,
or other reasons. Notably, the VanEck SolidX Bitcoin ETF would have insured
its holdings and followed best practices regarding storage of Bitcoin; thus, as
VanEck has argued, investors may have been interested in the VanEck SolidX
Bitcoin ETF as a secure, insured way to gain exposure to Bitcoin, some of the
attractions of which include its role as diversification investment that acts as a
hedge against systemic risk 152 or its underlying blockchain technology.
Though this ETF proposal has been withdrawn as of the time of this writing,
it illustrates a commercial trajectory which will shed light on Bitcoin
transactions. This development would create, as did the proliferation of digital
asset exchanges, a potential repository of relevant transaction information
regarding markets in Bitcoin—information upon which tax authorities might
rely. Those who invest in such a Bitcoin ETF would, of course, be subject to tax
reporting in the same way as others who invest in ETFs. It is more noteworthy
that the VanEck SolidX Bitcoin ETF would have ordered the over-the-counter
market and made it more regulable; the VanEck SolidX Bitcoin ETF would have
made it easier for government to know the identities of those in some significant
part of the over-the-counter market who have transacted directly on the Bitcoin
network and what they are doing or have done.
2.

Bakkt

A project that aims to serve institutions with an infrastructure for digital
assets offers another example of the emergence of intermediaries that may
facilitate tax compliance. In August of 2018, Inter-Continental Exchange, a large
operator of global exchanges including the New York Stock Exchange,
announced plans to form a company—Bakkt—that would offer a regulated
platform for institutions and consumers to buy, sell, store, and spend digital
assets on a global network. 153
Bakkt plans to offer all aspects of a futures market, including physical
delivery and warehousing of Bitcoin, market surveillance, reporting, and
152. Letter from Jan F. van Eck, President and CEO, Van Eck Associates Corporation, to Dalia
Blass, Director, Division of Investment Management, United States Securities and Exchange
Commission (July 20, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/van-eck-associates-innova
tion-cryptocurrency.pdf [https://perma.cc/D2A4-AH5W].
153. Press Release, Intercontinental Exchange, Intercontinental Exchange Announces Bakkt,
A Global Platform and Ecosystem for Digital Assets (Aug. 3, 2018), https://ir.theice.com/press/
press-releases/all-categories/2018/08-03-2018-133022149 [https://perma.cc/2Y6T-QPKL].
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consistent standards for compliance with anti-money laundering and knowyour-customer rules. 154 Bakkt also purports to offer new and higher security
standards. Bakkt had been in development for fourteen months before public
announcement of it in August of 2018. 155 The announcement indicated Bakkt
would partner with Starbucks, Microsoft, BCG, and others on its payment
platform; though Starbucks will not accept Bitcoin, the Bakkt platform will
enable customers to convert digital assets to USD for use at Starbucks. 156
Bakkt attempts to address the requirements of regulated institutions in using
digital assets. 157 Despite or perhaps because of Bitcoin’s decentralization, Bakkt
purports to bring a secure central infrastructure to Bitcoin with the sort of
regulatory compliance necessary for the trust of large institutions. 158 In its
spokesperson’s words, Bakkt seeks to meet the connectivity and participation
requirements of large financial institutions. 159 Bakkt aims to remedy what it
considers the flawed state of the Bitcoin market and facilitate trusted price
formation—a fundamental part of advancing digital currency markets in its
view. 160
For Bakkt to function on the institutional scale that its founders envision, it
must transact at a much faster pace than the seven transactions per second
permitted by the base layer of the Bitcoin network. 161 If Bakkt becomes the
clearing house that it imagines, however, it can keep track of millions of
transactions every day within the Bakkt ecosystem. 162 It can keep a ledger of
offsetting Bitcoin debits and credits, and only needs to broadcast to the wider
Bitcoin network payments coming into or exiting Bakkt’s warehouse. 163
Whether or not Bakkt meets with success, it is another example of the
different kinds of intermediaries emerging in this space which can facilitate tax

154. Id.
155. Shawn Tully, The NYSE’s Owner Wants to Bring Bitcoin to Your 401(k). Are Crypto
Credit Cards Next?, FORTUNE (Aug. 3, 2018), http://fortune.com/longform/nyse-owner-bitcoin-ex
change-startup/.
156. Olivia Capozzalo, ‘No Coffee for Bitcoin,’ Starbucks Clarifies as Media Misrepresent Its
New Crypto Venture, COINDESK (Aug. 5, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/news/no-coffee-for-bit
coin-starbucks-clarifies-as-media-misrepresent-its-new-crypto-venture [https://perma.cc/U3EL-Q
QR6].
157. Kelly Loeffler, What Bakkt Aims to Solve as a First Step, BAKKT BLOG (Sept. 18, 2018),
https://medium.com/bakkt-blog/what-bakkt-aims-to-solve-as-a-first-step-afa7c56b10d7
[https://perma.cc/JM3T-BH55].
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Kelly Loeffler, An Evolving Market, BAKKT BLOG (Aug. 20, 2018), https://medium.com
/bakkt-blog/https-medium-com-kellyloeffler-price-discovery-f9c77885383 [https://perma.cc/38M
J-TVHM].
161. Tully, supra note 155.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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compliance. It, like Coinbase or a Bitcoin ETF, may become a repository of
relevant transaction information that the IRS could pursue with a John Doe
summons or through Bakkt’s willingness to cooperate with regulatory
authorities. Importantly, part of the way Bakkt contributes to the broader Bitcoin
ecosystem involves, perhaps obviously, more than commercial, legal, or
regulatory efforts. To the extent it operates a second-layer ledger, it can enable
much greater transaction speeds than permitted by the base layer of the Bitcoin
network; in this way, Bakkt makes a technical contribution that very
approximately resembles the concept behind the lightning network.
3.

The Lightning Network

The lightning network highlights the ways in which resort to networks or
intermediaries that operate with Bitcoin’s protocol is, in some sense, a technical
necessity as more users attempt to transact in Bitcoin. Bitcoin’s base layer does
not permit a high number of transactions per second as a technical matter. 164 For
that reason, Joseph Poon and Thaddeus Dryja proposed the lightning network in
2016. 165
The lightning network constitutes a second layer payment protocol that
operates on top of the Bitcoin network. 166 It would enable higher transaction
throughput, and consists of a network of peer-to-peer, bidirectional payment
channels in which transfers are made off of the underlying blockchain in
Bitcoin. 167 Poon and Dryja describe the network as follows:
Micropayment channels create a relationship between two parties to perpetually
update balances, deferring what is broadcast to the blockchain in a single
transaction netting out the total balance between those two parties. This permits
the financial relationships between two parties to be trustlessly deferred to a later
date, without risk of counterparty default. Micropayment channels use real
bitcoin transactions, only electing to defer the broadcast to the blockchain in
such a way that both parties can guarantee their current balance on the
blockchain; this is not a trusted overlay network—payments in micropayment
channels are real bitcoin communicated and exchanged off-chain. 168

Multiple parties are currently pursuing this idea, and this development would
enable a significantly higher number of transactions per second than the base
layer of the Bitcoin network currently allows. 169
164. See GERARD, supra note 59, at 69; Croman et al., supra note 59, at 108.
165. Joseph Poon & Thaddeus Dryja, The Bitcoin Lightning Network: Scalable Off-Chain
Instant Payments, LIGHTNING NETWORK 1 (Jan. 14, 2016), https://lightning.network/lightning-net
work-paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4GK-DNSK]
166. Id. at 4.
167. Id. at 7.
168. Id. at 4.
169. See, e.g., Shirza Jagati, Bitcoin Lightning Newtwork Beta is Now Live, CRYPTOSLATE
(Mar. 16, 2018), https://cryptoslate.com/bitcoin-lightning-network-beta-now-live/ [https://perma.
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D. Effect of Intermediaries on Tax Compliance
It is understandable that early scholars might speculate upon the possibilities
of tax evasion when examining the pseudonymous, decentralized Bitcoin
network. That technical architecture certainly matters, and Lessig reminds us
that four modalities of regulation, among other potential modalities, operate
together: law, norms, markets, and architecture. 170 By architecture, Lessig
means structures of social life, whether made or found, which enable or constrain
behavior. 171 In the present context, architecture refers to the structures, whether
virtual or physical, which shape and guide how an individual interacts with
Bitcoin. When it came about, Bitcoin served as a novel architecture which
enabled a kind of behavior not previously possible; users could pseudonymously
transmit value on a peer-to-peer basis. Thus, tax scholars were correct to suspect
that Bitcoin might enable tax evasion.172
The cases above, however, demonstrate that different kinds of
intermediaries and gatekeepers can fill the role of facilitating tax compliance and
thereby make this space more regulable by tax authorities. The commercial
demands of markets have resulted in the generation of online wallets, digital
asset exchanges, and other intermediaries between the Bitcoin protocol and end
users; a Bitcoin ETF, a digital asset clearinghouse, and the lightning network are
emerging to meet other market demands. Many users, it seems, cede the
pseudonymity of operating at the base layer for the convenience of an online
wallet or exchange. They might do the same for the transactional speed of the
lightning network or for the insurance and risk mitigation which other
commercial efforts offer. The John Doe summons on Coinbase shows how the
law may effectively operate through these structures to compel tax compliance.
Furthermore, enforcement and norms influence one another in tax
compliance. 173 Though some have argued that enforcement might “crowd out”
taxpayers’ intrinsic motivations to comply with the tax code, 174 or be otherwise
counterproductive, Leandra Lederman argues that enforcement and a
compliance norm need not be inconsistent. 175 Specifically, she argues that

cc/D9JK-PFBY] (“Similar to how the Internet is built in layers, Lightning creates an entirely new
layer, offering instant, high-volume payments that are denominated in the blockchain’s native
currency.”).
170. Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEG. STUD. 661, 664, 667 (1998).
171. Id. at 663.
172. Viswanathan, supra note 1, at 325; Marian, Are Crytocurrencies Tax Havens?, supra note
1, at 38..
173. Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance,
64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1453–54 (2003).
174. Leandra Lederman, Does Enforcement Reduce Voluntary Tax Compliance?, 2018 BYU
L. REV. 623, 630–46 (2018).
175. Lederman, supra note 173, at 1453.
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enforcement can buttress norms-based appeals for compliance. 176 She outlines
the ways in which there may be a group norm of noncompliance despite a
general societal norm of tax compliance in the US. 177 The IRS, she contends,
could use enforcement to build a critical mass of compliant taxpayers and
thereby influence the taxpaying norms of non-compliant groups. 178
In addition, the development of these intermediaries is significant not only
because they allow points of enforcement, but because they could enable
comprehensive information reporting, or even withholding someday. The
government could use the information for information-return matching, “a
highly effective form of audit not captured in audit statistics,” 179 or more
traditional enforcement actions. 180 More importantly, information reporting and
withholding facilitate voluntary tax compliance, as they constrain the
opportunity to evade tax. 181 Information reporting alerts the taxpayer that the
government is watching. 182 Thus, it is extremely significant that Coinbase is
working with the IRS to develop a form of information reporting for
cryptocurrency transactions. 183 In this vein, certain foreign tax authorities are
simply requesting transaction information from exchanges. 184
The development of intermediaries in Bitcoin’s ecosystem holds the
potential to enable IRS enforcement actions and perhaps, eventually,
comprehensive information reporting and withholding. The latter two affect
voluntary tax compliance, and enforcement actions can affect norms of
compliance. These trajectories of increasing compliance can supplement efforts
around Bitcoin’s distinctive and principal characteristic—its blockchain.

176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1453–54. Shapiro argues that the IRS should consider the cryptocurrency community
as a strategic actor in its enforcement model. Shapiro, supra note 80, at 9.
179. Lederman, supra note 174, at 647 (“[P]ractically speaking, information-return matching
is a highly effective form of audit not captured in audit statistics.”).
180. Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax Gap: When is
Information Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1733, 1738 (2010).
181. Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance and the Reformed IRS, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 971, 974
(2003) (“[S]imple comparison of relatively high rates of voluntary compliance rates with relatively
low audit rates and penalties is flawed because it does not account for the role of information
reporting and withholding in constraining the opportunity to evade tax.”).
182. Lederman, supra note 180, at 1738–39 (“What likely makes information reporting so
successful in spurring compliance in the first instance is that . . . the taxpayer is aware that the
government is watching.”).
183. Bloomberg Interview with Coinbase CEO and Co-Founder Brian Armstrong at Players
Technology Summit, San Francisco, CA (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xA
BO3BKUxG8 [https://perma.cc/B5P3-SSLQ].
184. Matt Thompson, HMRC Asks Cryptocurrency Exchanges for UK Customer Info, LAW360
(Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.law360.com/financial-services-uk/articles/1186075/hmrc-asks-crypto
currency-exchanges-for-uk-customer-info [https://perma.cc/PT4J-GPE9].
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III. BITCOIN’S BLOCKCHAIN AS A TOOL OF TAX COMPLIANCE
Though a significant portion of users increasingly interact or will interact
with Bitcoin by way of some of the commercial and/or technical efforts
described above, users can, of course, sidestep those intermediaries and transact
directly on the Bitcoin network. With respect to those transactions, however,
Bitcoin is uniquely regulable for tax purposes: the publicly visible, trustworthy
nature of Bitcoin’s blockchain allows tax authorities to observe transaction
flows, and thus offers authorities a unique window into tax compliance.
Bitcoin’s publicly visible blockchain is a transactional ledger which functions
as a shared truth 185 and cannot be falsified. Unlike cash transactions, which are
routinely falsified in tax records, 186 Bitcoin’s blockchain consists of the agreedupon history of transactions rather than a subsequent record of them which is
amenable to falsification.
This Part first offers background on blockchain’s role as a shared truth. The
first section also outlines existing efforts by the IRS to examine Bitcoin’s
blockchain for tax evasion. 187 The second section offers another proposal by
which tax authorities might use blockchain’s publicly visible, trustworthy
transactional ledger to increase tax compliance: the IRS might offer a reward for
technically savvy whistleblowers to scour the blockchain and determine
identities that correspond to public Bitcoin addresses at issue.
A.

Blockchain as a Shared Truth

Blockchain’s significance is best understood in the context of a wider
deterioration of social trust. 188 Indexes such as the Edelman Trust Barometer
which document societal trust have, for the most part, shown a decline of trust
for some time, with a recent acceleration in the erosion of trust. 189 Blockchain
offers a unique model of trust well-suited to social conditions in which levels of
trust are deteriorating; 190 in the context of blockchains, nothing is presumed
trustworthy except the product of the network itself. 191 Such a trustworthy
185. WERBACH, supra note 23, at 28–30.
186. Jay A. Soled, To Close the Tax Gap, Eliminate Cash, TAXNOTES, Apr. 23, 2007, at 379
(“Because cash transactions fall below the IRS detection apparatus, they are the single largest
contributor to overall tax noncompliance.”).
187. See, e.g., Joseph Cox, IRS Now Has a Tool to Unmask Bitcoin Tax Cheats, THE DAILY
BEAST (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.thedailybeast.com/irs-now-has-a-tool-to-unmask-bitcoin-taxcheats [https://perma.cc/AG9N-G3GA].
188. WERBACH, supra note 23, at 30–31. See also DON TAPSCOTT & ALEX TAPSCOTT,
BLOCKCHAIN REVOLUTION: HOW THE TECHNOLOGY BEHIND BITCOIN IS CHANGING MONEY,
BUSINESS, AND THE WORLD 10–11 (2016).
189. WERBACH, supra note 23, at 18.
190. Id. at 28–30.
191. Id. at 29 (“On a blockchain network, nothing is assumed to be trustworthy . . . except the
output of the network itself.”).
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transactional record could serve as a useful tool for individuals distrustful of
counterparties, traditional intermediaries, or central banks, but also could serve
as a helpful tool for governments distrustful of at least some taxpayers.
1.

Falsification of Cash Transactions and the Tax Gap

The tax gap—the difference between taxes actually paid and taxes owed—
remains a severe problem in the United States. 192 The most recent estimates by
the IRS—from 2008 to 2010, which might be yet another indication of how
backlogged the agency is—show an average tax gap of $458 billion annually. 193
The use of physical currency plays a large part in enabling tax evasion or
underreporting. 194 Three scholars who conducted qualitative interviews with
cash business owners outline the ways in which they underreport receipts and
evade taxes. 195 Academics have even advocated for the elimination of or
limitation on the use of cash to reduce tax evasion. 196
In this vein, Alm and Soled describe how electronic payment systems will
reduce the ability of taxpayers to hide income:
The use of electronic means of payment will almost certainly reduce the extent
of the underground economy because individuals who once routinely hid their
transactions via cash will now be stripped of this luxury. Every electronic
payment leaves an indelible mark; these “marks” enable IRS auditors to
accurately access income flows. To minimize their taxable income (e.g., the
underreporting gap), taxpayers may continue to overstate their deductions and
expenses (for which auditors can demand substantiation), but their income can
no longer be readily hidden or camouflaged. 197

Alm and Soled, however, identify the rise of Bitcoin and other forms of virtual
currency as examples of how advances in technology may increase the
possibility of tax evasion. 198
192. James Alm & Jay A. Soled, W(h)ither the Tax Gap?, 92 WASH. L. REV. 521, 522–23
(2017).
193. Id. at 523; Internal Revenue Service, Tax Gap Estimates for Tax Years 2008–2010,
IRS.GOV (Apr. 2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/tax%20gap%20estimates%20for%2020
08%20through%202010.pdf [https://perma.cc/3H7A-S28F].
194. See Alm & Soled, supra note 192, at 530; Soled, supra note 186, at 379; Susan C. Morse
et al., Cash Businesses and Tax Evasion, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 37, 39–40 (2009).
195. Morse et al., supra note 193, at 65–67 (“Cash business owners rely on parallel cash
economies to underreport receipts and thereby evade income, employment and sales taxes.”).
196. See, e.g., Alm & Soled, supra note 192, at 532; Jeffrey H. Kahn & Gregg Polsky, The End
of Cash, the Income Tax, and the Next 100 Years, 41 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 159, 161–65 (2013);
Lawrence Summers, Killing This “Bin Laden” Is a Bloodless Victory, WASH. POST (May 9, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/killing-this-bin-laden-is-a-no-brainer/2016/05/08/388
43682-1515-11e6-aa55-670cabef46e0_story.html [https://perma.cc/R3EC-GDE9].
197. Alm & Soled, supra note 192, at 532.
198. Id. at 563 (“Advances in technology may actually increase the possibility for tax
evasion.”).
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Bitcoin’s Blockchain as a Tool

In contrast to the way in which cash transactions enable underreporting,
Bitcoin’s publicly visible blockchain offers a powerful tool of trustworthy
record keeping. First, anyone, including the government, may examine the
transaction history of Bitcoin. Though some perceive Bitcoin as an anonymous
payment network, the blockchain permanently and publicly stores all
transactions. 199 This amounts to an extraordinary level of transparency. 200
Second, that ledger cannot be falsified. Cash transactions may have a
subsequent record susceptible to falsification, if a record exists at all. Electronic
transactions that rely on credit or debit cards fare better, though even in those
cases falsification is possible if one is relying on a business’s records. The
OECD documented the possibility of electronic suppression of credit and debit
sales in a 2013 report. 201
Bitcoin’s blockchain, on the other hand, does not merely consist of a record
of transactions; the blockchain consists of actual transactions. 202 At the
beginning of his book How to Do Things With Words, J.L. Austin draws a
distinction between descriptive and performative language. 203 Performative
language effects actions in the world, the paradigmatic example of which is the
“I do” at a wedding; it serves to seal the union. Descriptive language, on the
other hand, contains statements that might be true or false. 204 The IRS can rely
on the blockchain because it is the performative script by which value has been
transferred. If a recipient has, in fact, received Bitcoin, the transaction must be
in the blockchain; he or she must rely on the blockchain as much as the IRS can
rely on it.

199. Protect Your Privacy, BITCOIN.ORG, https://bitcoin.org/en/protect-your-privacy
[https://perma.cc/633T-L2GK] (last visited Aug. 7, 2019) (“All Bitcoin transactions are public,
traceable, and permanently stored in the Bitcoin network.”).
200. Id. (“Bitcoin works with an unprecedented level of transparency that most people are not
used to dealing with.”).
201. Electronic Sales Suppression: A Threat to Tax Revenues, OECD 13 (2013),
https://www.oecd.org/ctp/crime/electronic-sales-suppression-a-threat-to-tax-revenues.htm
[https://perma.cc/VXD8-GMR7] (“However, recently evidence of the suppression of credit and
debit sales has also been found.”).
202. Luke Fortney, Blockchain Explained, INVESTOPEDIA (June 25, 2019), https://www.invest
opedia.com/terms/b/blockchain.asp [https://perma.cc/2M2C-EK6Z]. Also, eventual tax reporting
in Bitcoin should involve relatively minimal marginal costs. Parties must render certain script
governing their transaction intelligible to the Service but need not create a record out of whole
cloth.
203. J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 6–7 (1975).
204. Id. at 6.
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Unraveling Pseudonymity

The IRS will not be able to take advantage of the trustworthy, publicly visible
nature of Bitcoin’s blockchain if it cannot crack the system’s pseudonymous public
keys. Recent efforts suggest the IRS has begun to find success.

Some exchanges or services might make public keys visible for transfers,
payments, or donations. For example, Bitcoin Core, the developers who
maintain the reference implementation of Bitcoin’s software, maintain a single,
visible public key for donations as of the time of this writing. 205 In a leaked IRS
presentation on how the agency’s criminal investigators might find tax evasion
in Bitcoin, James Daniels of IRS Cyber Crimes notes that even in the case where
the target of the investigation does not use a third-party exchange, he or she may
have a publicly available Bitcoin address, such as one posted on social media. 206
A virtually infinite number of Bitcoin addresses can be generated, however.
For example, the Wikileaks donation page contains a refresh button next to the
donation address, which replaces the address with a freshly generated address. 207
Similarly, if a user refreshes the page or visits it later after closing it, he or she
will encounter a new address. 208
But even Wikileak’s donations can potentially be linked. 209 If Wikileaks
paid one Bitcoin for the creation of a new website, it has to create a single
transaction likely having inputs at multiple addresses. 210 If we imagine
donations of 0.1 Bitcoin each, then Wikileaks must create a transaction with
inputs at ten different address, and thus has revealed that these ten addresses are
controlled by a single entity. 211
A set of computer scientists attempting to understand the Bitcoin economy
used the “idiom of use” above and others to cluster Bitcoin addresses. 212 They
write,
[U]sing a small number of transactions labeled through our own empirical
interactions with various services, we identify major institutions and the
205. Bitcoin Core, BITCOIN.ORG, https://bitcoin.org/en/bitcoin-core/ [https://perma.cc/5K8QNM6R] (last visited Aug. 5, 2019).
206. Presentation of James Daniels, Internal Revenue Service- Criminal Investigation, Cyber
Crimes 97 (undated) (released July 12, 2019), https://www.coindesk.com/irs-confirms-it-trainedstaff-on-finding-crypto-wallets [https://perma.cc/94KV-HKJ5?type=image] (“[T]he Subject’s
Bitcoin Addresses may be publicly available and tied to the Subject, such as through posts by the
Subject on his Facebook page or Twitter account.”).
207. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 143.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 144.
210. Id. at 145.
211. Id.
212. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 146; Sarah Meiklejohn et al., A Fistful of Bitcoins:
Characterizing Payments Among Men With No Names, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 13TH ACM
INTERNET MEASUREMENT CONFERENCE 127, 138 (2013), https://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~smeiklejohn/
files/imc13.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RZW-4ZHL].
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interactions between them. Even our relatively small experiment demonstrates
that this approach can shed considerable light on the structure of the Bitcoin
economy, how it is used, and those organizations who are party to it. 213

Actual pseudonymity achieved by users falls short of the potential pseudonymity
available in the Bitcoin protocol, and significant effort would be required to
achieve that potential. 214
The government has made inroads in this vein. At a panel on
cryptocurrencies at the Milken Institute’s 2018 Global Conference, Brent
McIntosh, General Counsel at the Department of the Treasury, smilingly noted
that cryptocurrency presents both risks and opportunities from a compliance
perspective; 215 presumably the publicly visible blockchain constitutes the
principal opportunity from a compliance perspective.
More concretely, in 2017 the Service engaged the company Chainalysis to
locate potential tax evasion or tax fraud. 216 Chainalysis offers a tool to analyze
and track Bitcoin transactions based on the blockchain. 217 Its software can
follow Bitcoin as it moves from and/or among wallets and exchanges. 218
The IRS presentation on how the agency’s criminal investigators might find
tax evasion in Bitcoin shows how the IRS relies on Bitcoin’s blockchain. It
advises criminal investigators to use a web tool that provides information about
Bitcoin blocks, addresses, and transactions after determination of a Bitcoin
address. The presentation describes how investigators can determine transaction
value and transaction times. 219 The presentation goes on to note different
companies whose software can accurately trace the history of Bitcoin payments
and wallets, such as Chainalysis and others. 220

213. Meiklejohn et al., supra note 212, at 138.
214. Id.at 138–39; see also Yee, supra note 20, at 4 (“Using data mining approaches, value
flows through the system can be reconstructed and thus regulative policies enforced.”).
215. Bill Barhydt et al., Speakers at the Global Conference 2018, Cryptocurrencies: Irrational
Exuberance or Brave New World?, MILKEN INST., (May 2, 2018), http://archive.milkeninstitute.
org/videos/view/cryptocurrencies-irrational-exuberance-or-brave-new-world?BackURL=%2Fvid
eos%2F.
216. Cox, supra note 187.
217. CHAINALYSIS, https://www.chainalysis.com/ [https://perma.cc/NNJ8-2ZS8] (last visited
Aug. 5, 2019). Similarly, CipherTrace, a start-up founded in 2015, positions itself as a blockchain
forensics team and has developed cryptocurrency tracing capabilities. CIPHERTRACE, https://cip
hertrace.com/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/25VN-SDUR] (last visited Aug. 5, 2019).
218. Cox, supra note 187 (“The software can follow bitcoin as it moves from one wallet to
another, and eventually to an exchange where the bitcoin user will likely cash out into dollars or
another currency.”).
219. Presentation by James Daniels, supra note 206, at 98–101 (“Once a Bitcoin Address is
identified, it can be looked up on a Bitcoin Block Chain Explorer to find information such as value,
transaction times, transaction locations, which may help in corroborating information, identifying
additional addresses, or assist [sic] in locating the Subject.”).
220. Id. at 103.
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Adaptation of IRS Whistleblower Program

The IRS has had a whistleblower program for many decades, and Bitcoin’s
publicly visible blockchain presents a unique arena to crowdsource tax
compliance efforts. The community of developers around blockchain often
conduct “bug bounties” to encourage a large and diverse population of
programmers to identify security vulnerabilities. 221 Bitcoin’s blockchain
presents a somewhat similar opportunity for the IRS to encourage a large
population to help identify tax noncompliance.
1.

Background on Bug Bounties

Bug bounty programs offer money, recognition, and other rewards to
hackers who identify security vulnerabilities in software. 222 Bug bounties are
particularly well-suited to blockchains, and specifically certain autonomous
contracts which run on blockchains, in light of heightened security vulnerability,
unique economic properties, and other considerations. 223 Bug bounties are
compatible with blockchains partly because of the economic value of
cryptocurrencies and smart contracts, which facilitates principled bountysetting, and the transparency of bounties in the context of smart contracts. 224
There are at least two benefits of bug bounty programs. First, a large and
diverse population of hackers examines the software at issue for security
vulnerabilities. 225 Second, these public programs can signal an organization’s
commitment to continual security improvement to third parties. 226
To achieve and maintain a critical mass of hackers who participate in bug
bounties, many bug bounty platforms rely on techniques of gamification. 227

221. See, e.g., ETHEREUM BOUNTY PROGRAM, https://bounty.ethereum.org/ [https://perma.cc/
2ZXM-UHW4] (last visited Aug. 5, 2019); BUG BOUNTY, KRAKEN https://www.kraken.com/enus/features/security/bug-bounty [https://perma.cc/S4E3-DA5D] (last visited Aug. 5, 2019).
222. Aron Laszka et al., Banishing Misaligned Incentives for Validating Reports in Bug-Bounty
Platforms, in COMPUTER SECURITY—ESORICS 2016: 21ST EUROPEAN SYMPOSIUM ON
RESEARCH IN COMPUTER SECURITY, HERAKLION, GREECE, SEPTEMBER 26–30, 2016,
PROCEEDINGS, PART II 161, 161–78 (2016), http://aronlaszka.com/papers/laszka2016banish
ing.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6HC-W43T] (“White hat hackers are encouraged to submit reports for
potential vulnerabilities, which after validation by the organization will be rewarded, for example,
with monetary bounties.”).
223. Lorenz Breidenbach et al., Enter the Hydra: Towards Principled Bug Bounties and
Exploit-Resistant Smart Contracts, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 27TH USENIX SECURITY SYMPOSIUM
1335, 1336 (Aug. 15–17, 2018), https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity18/
sec18-breidenbach.pdf [https://perma.cc/CAD9-3KJ4].
224. Id.
225. Laszka et al., supra note 222, at 161.
226. Id.
227. Jukka Ruohonen & Luca Allodi, A Bug Bounty Perspective on the Disclosure of Web
Vulnerabilities 4 (May 24, 2018), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1805.09850.pdf [https://perma.cc/EZS9-
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Gamification involves, perhaps obviously, introducing elements of play and
gaming into non-game situations; 228 it “blurs the line between work and
leisure.” 229
2.

The IRS’s Whistleblower Program

The federal government has a long history of paying informants for blowing
the whistle on tax evasion. 230 Senator Harry Reid (D-Nev.) spoke against then
current formulation of the IRS Whistleblower Program in 1998 and called it the
“Award for Rats Program” and the “Snitch Program.” 231 Reid backed away from
his proposal to eliminate the program, however, and the Senate instead required
the Service to study the program. 232 The Service studied the program, and a later
2006 report by the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration found that
the whistleblower program was more effective on a dollars per hour basis than
the Service’s primary method for selecting returns for audit. 233 This led
Congress to expand the IRS Whistleblower Program in 2006. 234
Under the expanded program, the IRS must award payments to
whistleblowers under certain conditions, 235 and retains discretion to make
awards outside of those conditions. 236 If the IRS proceeds with an administrative
or judicial action based on a whistleblower’s information, the whistleblower will
receive at least 15% and not more than 30% of the proceeds collected. 237 This
depends upon the extent to which the whistleblower “substantially contributed”
to the action. 238 If the action applies to an individual, however, the individual’s
gross income must exceed $200,000 and the tax proceeds in dispute must exceed
two million dollars. 239 Even if these conditions are not met, however, the IRS

MQS6] (“For achieving and maintaining the critical mass, many bug bounty platforms rely on socalled gamification techniques.”).
228. Miriam A. Cherry, The Gamification of Work, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 851, 852 (2012) (“In
the language of cyberspace, introducing elements of play and gaming into non-game situations is
known as the process of ‘gamification.’”).
229. Id.
230. Michelle M. Kwon, Whistling Dixie about the IRS Whistleblower Program Thanks to the
IRC Confidentiality Restrictions, 29 VA. TAX REV. 447, 448–49 (2010) (“The Internal Revenue
Service . . . has been authorized for over 140 years to pay awards to individuals who blow the
whistle on those who do not pay the taxes they owe.”).
231. Id. at 449.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b)(1) (2019).
236. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(a) (2019).
237. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b)(1) (2019).
238. Id.
239. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b)(5) (2019).
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retains the discretion to make a proportionally smaller award to a
whistleblower. 240
A prominent recent case of whistleblowing on tax evasion involved the
IRS’s award in 2012 of $104 million to former UBS banker Bradley
Birkenfeld. 241 Though Birkenfeld received what is thought to be the largest-ever
whistleblower payout, he also served a forty-month sentence for one count of
conspiracy to defraud the US. 242 Birkenfeld had provided prosecutors with
details regarding UBS’s efforts to promote tax evasion. 243
3.

A Tailored Whistleblowing Program for Bitcoin

Under this proposal, the IRS would periodically publicize lists of Bitcoin
payment addresses for which it seeks identities. Players can then compete using
technical tools to explore Bitcoin’s blockchain 244 and/or rely on insider
knowledge to determine the identities that correspond to these addresses; players
might include the very companies that have developed tools to track Bitcoin
based on its blockchain.
a.

Mechanics of a Tailored Whistleblower Program

The law and regulations under the IRS Whistleblowing Program provide the
Service a framework to disclose information to whistleblowers and relevant
transaction thresholds for targeting its efforts. Though tax returns and return
information are generally confidential, the statute contains a list of exceptions. 245
One exception exists for disclosures pursuant to contracts for equipment or
services for purposes of tax administration. 246 The Treasury Department issued
Regulations in 2011 which made it clear that the legislative exception also
allows the disclosure of return information to a whistleblower in connection with
a written contract between the IRS and the whistleblower for services relating to
the detection of tax violations. 247 There are, of course, safeguards for protecting
the information and penalties for unauthorized disclosure. 248 If the IRS finds the

240. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(a) (2019).
241. Laura Saunders & Robin Sidel, Whistleblower Gets $104 Million, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 11,
2012), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444017504577645412614237708
[https://perma.cc/B5JU-K23L] (“A former UBS AG banker who helped the U.S. government
unleash an international crackdown on tax evasion was awarded $104 million in what is believed
to be the largest-ever whistleblower payout to an individual.”).
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. See e.g., supra note 217.
245. See 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (2019).
246. 26 U.S.C. § 6103(n) (2019).
247. Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(n)-2(a)(1) (2018).
248. Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(n)-2(c), (d) (2018).
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whistleblower can perform his or her services reasonably by disclosure of only
part of the return information, then only that part will be disclosed. 249
Part of the attraction of a tailored whistleblower program in this context is
that Bitcoin’s blockchain offers a great deal of information, which allows the
IRS to disclose minimal return information. The IRS can merely separate Bitcoin
transactions into two groups: potentially relevant transactions and irrelevant
ones, which would include transactions for which tax has been paid, non-taxable
foreign transactions, or transactions too small to merit attention. The Bitcoin
payment addresses released by the IRS and for which the IRS seeks information
could come with contractual terms that meet the regulatory requirements
governing disclosures to whistleblowers. 250
Furthermore, the two-million-dollar threshold set forth by Congress, 251
which results in automatic whistleblower payouts, 252 provides the Service a
starting point for its focus. It can target addresses which engaged in transactions
larger than a value of two million dollars on a one-off basis or over the course
of a taxable year.
In sum, the IRS can use issue lists of Bitcoin payment addresses for which
it seeks identities; players compete to use their tools of choice and/or insider
knowledge to determine the identities that correspond to these addresses.
Furthermore, the IRS can provide metric-based rankings and constantly updated
dashboards for whistleblowers; these techniques of gamification have been
effective in the context of bug bounties. 253 Though payouts of whistleblowing
might be thought of as reward enough, those rewards are uncertain and come
only if, and after, the IRS completes its collection actions. In the meantime,
players might compete for points which correspond to transaction size.
b.

Benefits of a Tailored Whistleblower Program

There are multiple benefits to a tailored whistleblower program, including
its potential to draw a large, diverse pool of potential whistleblowers into the
effort, and the IRS’s ability to signal its commitment to compliance. A 2006
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration report found that the
whistleblower program was more effective on a dollars per hour basis than the
Service’s primary method for selecting returns for audit, and gamification may
further enhance effectiveness on a dollars per hour basis in comparison with the
Service’s primary method for selecting returns for audit.
249. Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(n)-2(b)(2) (2018).
250. See generally Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(n)-2(a)(1) (2018).
251. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b) (2019).
252. The individual’s gross income must also exceed $200,000; that could easily be the case if
the individual sold Bitcoin worth two million dollars or more. 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b)(5)(A) (2019).
253. Ruohonen & Allodi, supra note 227, at 4 (“These techniques include metric-based
rankings and constantly updated dashboards, badges for most productive hackers, and other
commonly used social reputation elements.”).
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Also, a large pool of potential whistleblowers may not only represent an
increasing number of eyeballs on tax evasion in Bitcoin; they might experiment
with and generate technical tools which make this process more efficient. Just
as a particular framework of competition and incentives has resulted in the
technical specialization of miners in Bitcoin, 254 perhaps a tailored whistleblower
program will result in similar specialization. That could take the form of further
research into “idioms of use” in Bitcoin, such as that of Meikeljohn et al.,
corresponding technical tools like those offered by Chainalysis and
CipherTrace, or altogether new technologies.
Second, the IRS can signal its commitment to policing tax compliance. Tax
scholars have documented a “chump” effect, according to which nobody wants
to pay taxes if others are not. 255 To the extent blockchain can enhance
transparency around tax compliance, it can thus help buck what might otherwise
be a broader cycle of dwindling tax compliance. 256
c.

Drawbacks of a Tailored Whistleblower Program

There are, however, drawbacks to creating a tailored whistleblower
program. First, there would, of course, be some cost to the Service in creating
such a program. Furthermore, the IRS may not be technically sophisticated
enough to assemble the proposed dashboard. Considering the comparative
effectiveness of whistleblowing on a dollars per hour basis, 257 and the possibility
of contracting the project out, these are not insuperable concerns.
A more serious objection centers around whether such techniques of
gamification trivialize what should be a weighty act: turning someone in for tax
evasion, which could result in serious penalties, including time in prison. Many
people, Senator Harry Reid included, 258 might opt not to participate in such a
program for ethical or social reasons. The IRS, however, could initiate this
254. NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 116 (noting that mining today is dominated by
application-specific integrated circuits, which “were designed, built, and optimized for the sole
purpose of mining bitcoins.”).
255. Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 604 (1996)
(“Even a strong propensity to obey the law . . . can be undercut by a person’s ‘desire not to be
suckered.’”); BRUNO S. FREY & STEPHEN MEIER, PRO-SOCIAL BEHAVIOR IN A NATURAL
SETTING, 54 J. OF ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 65, 74 (2004) (“An individual dislikes being a socalled ‘sucker’, i.e. being the only one who contributes to a public good while the others free-ride.”).
256. See generally LAWRENCE ZELENAK, LEARNING TO LOVE FORM 1040: TWO CHEERS FOR
THE RETURN-BASED MASS INCOME TAX 53–54 (2013).
257. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., THE INFORMANTS’ REWARDS PROGRAM
NEEDS MORE CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT 4 (2006), https://www.tax-whistle
blower.com/resources/200630092fr.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WMK-83MH] (“The IRS report also
found that examinations initiated based on informant information had a higher dollar yield per hour
and a lower no-change rate, when compared to returns selected using the IRS’ primary method of
selecting returns, the Discriminant Index Function (DIF).”).
258. Kwon, supra note 230, at 449.
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program with a supplemental voluntary disclosure program—otherwise known
as a tax amnesty—which could allow people to come forward and pay back taxes
without the risk of criminal prosecution. 259
Voluntary disclosure programs are particularly effective when coupled with
increased enforcement efforts. 260 For example, in 2008, the government sought
the names of US clients who opened UBS accounts in Switzerland with a John
Doe summons. 261 Eventually the US and Switzerland agreed to treat the request
as one made under the US-Swiss tax treaty, and the government received the
names of 4,450 US account-holders. 262 Around this time, the IRS announced the
2009 voluntary disclosure program for offshore tax evasion. 263 The government
did not disclose the names it earlier received from UBS, and thus,
unsurprisingly, many people, without knowing whether their names had already
been disclosed per the agreement under the US-Swiss tax treaty, came forward
to take advantage of the voluntary disclosure program. 264 Here, similarly, the
IRS could pursue increased enforcement actions, including novel proposals for
ferreting out tax noncompliance in Bitcoin, with a limited tax amnesty.
Bitcoin’s blockchain might serve as an important tool for the IRS. If
blockchain is a unique model of trust well-suited to social conditions in which
levels of trust are deteriorating, 265 it may also have a part to play in restoring the
trust of ordinary people in the fairness of their tax systems. 266 Though it might
259. Shapiro has proposed a voluntary disclosure program to supplement its John Doe
summonses in this area. Shapiro, supra note 80, at 11–13.
260. Leandra Lederman, The Use of Voluntary Disclosure Initiatives in the Battle Against
Offshore Tax Evasion, 57 VILL. L. REV. 499, 519 (2012) (“[A]n amnesty offered in conjunction
with a transition to increased enforcement of the laws subject to the amnesty may be particularly
effective at raising revenue.”).
261. Id. at 508–09.
262. Id. at 509.
263. Id. at 510.
264. The 2009 and 2011 voluntary tax amnesties concerning Americans with accounts at Swiss
banks were particularly successful. Jeffrey A. Neiman, Opting Out: The Solution for the NonWillful OVDI Taxpayer, TAXNOTES (Sept. 12, 2011), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-federal
/compliance/opting-out-solution-non-willful-ovdi-taxpayer/2011/09/12/qnwg [https://perma.cc/H
8KL-923X]. Neiman writes in glowing terms:
Tens of thousands of Americans participated in the programs. The IRS collected billions of
dollars in unpaid taxes, interest, and penalties. Undeclared assets have been reported to the
IRS and will be taxed for years to come. The landscape in tax enforcement has forever
changed, and the Justice Department and IRS have broken the back of bank secrecy and
obtained a treasure-trove of information that will provide fodder for criminal and civil
investigations for the next 10 years.
Id.
265. WERBACH, supra note 23, at 28–31.
266. See generally OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT:
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 4 (2015), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-explanatory-statement2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6LH-SGWV] (describing “urgent need to restore the trust of ordinary
people in the fairness of their tax systems . . .”).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

218

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:181

strike some as unrealistic to imagine the IRS using Bitcoin’s blockchain in this
manner, the IRS’s savvy use of technical tools developed for Bitcoin’s
blockchain 267 suggests otherwise. The targeted proposal above lends further
credence to the idea of a potentially rich relationship between techniques of
governance and blockchain. 268
CONCLUSION
This Article argues that Bitcoin is increasingly regulable by tax authorities,
contrary to preliminary characterizations by tax scholars and others. First,
important commercial and technical intermediaries are emerging. These include
digital asset exchanges, online wallets, companies seeking to profit from Bitcoin
ETFs, outfits attempting to create centralized infrastructures that cater to
regulated institutions, and operators of lightning networks. The case of the John
Doe summons on Coinbase demonstrates that these intermediaries can, at least
in some instances, facilitate enforcement actions by the IRS. Eventually, these
intermediaries could engage in comprehensive information reporting for tax
purposes and/or withhold and remit tax payments to the IRS.
Second, the unique architecture of Bitcoin as a publicly visible transactional
ledger that, for practical purposes, cannot be falsified makes it unusually
regulable by tax authorities. The IRS can observe transaction flows, and it has
accordingly used technical tools to track Bitcoin transactions. Furthermore, the
IRS could spur companies and individuals to exert efforts in this vein with a
tailored whistleblower program; it could periodically release lists of public
Bitcoin addresses at issue with a dashboard that tracks whistleblowers’
contributions to uncovering the identities connected to these addresses. These
contributions may eventually materialize into monetary rewards under the IRS’s
existing whistleblower program.

267. See Presentation by James Daniels, supra note 205, at 97.
268. See generally WERBACH, supra note 23; DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 18; Nathan
Heller, Estonia, The Digital Republic, THE NEW YORKER (Dec. 11, 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/12/18/estonia-the-digital-republic
[https://perma.
cc/JSU3-54ZX].

